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1. Introduction 
“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are 
with the terrorists”, said George W. Bush in his speech after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in which 
he announced the foreign policy on the war on terrorism.1 In the same speech, Bush mentioned 
that the attacks were an attack on the democratic freedom of the United States (US) and an 
attack on all democracies in the world. Bush expected all states and actors within its influence 
to help and support this by the US designed war on terrorism.2 
The US has a long soft power policy history, with the aim to ensure that countries have 
the same ideas, norms and values.3 Particularly after the Second World War, the US “used soft-
power resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions”, to contain Soviet 
Power.4 The US was, together with the Soviet Union, a major power within the, at that time 
bipolar, world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused a shift towards a unipolar 
world order in which the US was the only remaining major power.5 Nowadays, scholars seem 
to be divided whether the US’ power is declining, rising or consistent. Within this debate, it 
seems that scholars mainly consider the hard power of the US. Scholars who have considered 
the soft power, seem to agree that this power of the US declined. However, an important soft 
power scholar, Joseph S. Nye Jr., claimed in 2010 that the election of Barack Obama could lead 
to a shift in the soft power of the US.6 
Therefore, this research considers the fluctuation of soft power of the US regarding the 
war on terrorism between Bush and Obama, using the following research question: to what 
extent has there been a shift in US soft power considering the war on terrorism between Bush 
and Obama from 2001 to 2016? This research will consider the research question with three 
different measurements – the discourse, allied support and polls – regarding the war on 
                                                          
1 The Guardian, “Text of George Bush’s speech,” The Guardian, September 21, 2001, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17, no. 
4 (1993): 33. 
4 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry,” Foreign Affairs 
83, no. 3 (2004): 16; Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: 
Basic Books, 1990), 231-232. 
5 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
2000 (New York: Random House Inc., 1987), 357; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” 
International Security 40, no.3 (2015/2016): 7; Christopher Layne, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” 
The National Interest 119 (2012): 25-27; Henry H. Sun, “International political marketing: a case study of 
United States soft power and public diplomacy,” Journal of Public Affairs 8, no. 3 (2008): 176; Layne, “The 
Unipolar Illusion,” 5. 
6 Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, historical and 
contemporary perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2010), 222. 
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terrorism, to see if there was a difference, and how this difference fluctuated, in soft power 
between president Bush and Obama. These measurements are deducted from Nye Jr.’s idea that 
soft power can be measured by “resources”, “behavioural outcomes”, and polls.7 Although there 
are other factors of influence on the fluctuation of soft power, this thesis only focuses on these.  
Frequently mentioned concepts within this thesis are the war on terrorism and soft 
power. The war on terrorism consists of “broad military, political and legal initiatives launched 
by the United States and its allies following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001”, which 
is focussed on “a global campaign against terrorist organizations, individuals, and state 
sponsors of terrorism”.8 Where Bush used the term war on terrorism, Obama said in May 2013: 
“We must define our effort not as a boundless ‘Global War on Terror’, but rather as a series of 
persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten 
America”.9 Although the words for this foreign policy changed, the target of fighting terrorism 
remained the same. Therefore, throughout the thesis the term war on terrorism is used, also 
when analysing from 2013 onwards. 
The war on terrorism seems to be identified with hard power. What should not be 
neglected, however, is the soft power part: allied countries that support and contribute to the 
war on terrorism are important.10 Soft power is conceived by Nye Jr. and is “indirect or co-
optive power behavior”, where the goal is to “getting others to want what you want”.11 A 
synonym for soft power is attractive power, since it is important to have the “ability to move 
people by argument” and “the ability to entice and attract”.12 According to Nye Jr., soft power 
is needed, firstly, because it is important that other countries see the power of a country as 
legitimate and attractive. Then other countries will be more likely to follow and to accept 
policies of that country. Secondly, soft power is needed because hard power is no longer 
effective in facing new challenges that need collaboration between actors, such as terrorism, 
and since the appearance of non-state actors.13 
 There has been some debate regarding the link between soft power and international 
relations theory. Concerning his own concept of soft power, Nye Jr. claims that it cannot be 
                                                          
7 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 616 (2008): 95. 
8 Hugh B. Urban, “War on Terrorism,” in Encyclopedia of Global Religion, ed. Mark Juergensmeyer and Wade 
Clark Roof (Thousand Oaks California: SAGE Publications Inc., 2012), 1371. 
9 Paul D. Shinkman, “Obama: ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Over,” U.S. News & World Report, May 23, 2013, 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/23/obama-global-war-on-terror-is-over.  
10 Richard Jackson, “War on terrorism,” Britannica Academic, March 24, 2014, 
http://academic.eb.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/levels/collegiate/article/war-on-terrorism/601058#.  
11 Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, 31-32. 
12 Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 95. 
13 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 163, 167; Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, 32. 
   
 
5 
 
linked to any international relations theory.14 Although realism could be an option, because: 
“Realists come in many sizes and shapes, but all tend to argue that global politics is power 
politics”.15 However, the problem is that modern realists ignore soft power.16 Thus soft power 
cannot be linked to realism, or any other international relations theory, because: “Soft power is 
not a form of idealism or liberalism. It is simply a form of power, one way of getting desired 
outcomes”.17 Additionally, “Soft power is an analytical concept, not a theory”.18 
This research is of importance, since it contributes to the existing research considering 
the decline of soft power of the US. It also adds a comparison between the soft power of Bush 
and Obama regarding the war on terrorism to the existing research. According to Nye Jr., 
“presidential leadership” was of importance for the soft power of the US.19 Therefore, it is 
useful to map the differences between the presidents. Particularly, since president Obama 
recently gave over his presidency. Now is the time to take stock. This research therefore not 
only contributes to the current research, it could also have a social need “because its answer 
may help us to deal with one or another of the problems faced by our society”.20 Since the fight 
against terrorism is ongoing, lessons can be learned from Bush and Obama regarding the war 
on terrorism and soft power. 
The continuation of this thesis is as follows: a literature review in chapter two, followed 
by methodology in chapter three. Chapter four, five and six respectively will be about the 
discourse, allied support and polls, in line with the three measurements. Followed by chapter 
seven, the conclusion. Lastly, a bibliography in chapter eight and an appendix in chapter nine. 
                                                          
14 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 82. 
15 Ibid., 19. 
16 Ibid., 82; Parmar and Cox, Soft Power and US Foreign Policy, 219-221.  
17 Nye Jr., The Future of Power, 82. 
18 Parmar and Cox, Soft Power and US Foreign Policy, 219. 
19 Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, 228. 
20 James Babb, Empirical Political Analysis (Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Limited, 2012), 5. 
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2. Literature review 
Throughout the years there has been discussion among scholars about the shifting power of the 
US. Those scholars can roughly be divided in three groups: (1) scholars claiming that the US 
is, or will be, in a power decline21; (2) scholars claiming that the US is not in a power decline 
or even in a power increase22; and (3) scholars claiming that the US is in a power decline, but 
is still the major power in the world23. Overall, those scholars seem to have a realist approach, 
focussing on military and economic power fluctuations of the US. If they do talk about soft 
power, it is in combination with hard power. 
There seems to be less division among scholars focusing on the soft power fluctuations 
of the US, since they seem to agree that soft power of the US will decline or has declined. One 
of the most well-known scholars regarding soft power is, as mentioned before, Nye Jr. In his 
article ‘Soft Power’ he argues the exact opposite of what Paul Kennedy, mentioned above in 
the first group, argued. Kennedy warned the US for an overstretch and hard power decline 
because of global interests.24 Nye, however, claimed that these international commitments are 
important. He warned that if the US withdraws from international commitments, it will 
negatively impact hard and soft power.25 His argument is that as “the world’s wealthiest 
country, the US should be able to pay for both its international commitments and its domestic 
investments”.26 
Nye Jr. came back to above-mentioned later in his articles ‘Soft Power and American 
Foreign Policy’, ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry’ and 
‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, in which he claimed that polls show that the soft power of 
the US declined, in particular because of its foreign policy and its inability to fight international 
problems.27 The decline of soft power already started, according to Nye Jr., after the Cold War, 
when the US was “more interested in budget savings than in investments in soft power”.28 Soft 
power was no longer a priority for the US after the Cold War. 29 This changed after the terrorist 
                                                          
21 For example: Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.  
22 For example: Brooks and Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century”; 
Henry R. Nau, “Why ‘The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers’ was wrong,” Review of International Studies 27, 
vol. 4 (2001).   
23 For example: Layne, “The Global Power Shift from West to East”; Stefanie Ortmann and Nick Whittaker, 
“Geopolitics and Grand Strategy,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and 
Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
24 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 514-516. 
25 Nye Jr., “Soft Power,” 153. 
26 Ibid., 171. 
27 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (2004): 
255; Nye Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” 16; Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 96. 
28 Ibid., 98. 
29 Ibid., 99; Nye Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” 17. 
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attacks of 9/11: “Americans begin to rediscover the importance of investing in the instruments 
of soft power”.30 According to Nye Jr., the soft power of the US reached a low point when the 
claimed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were absent in Iraq.31 He is convinced that 
investing more in soft power will help America to “meet the new challenges” like terrorism.32 
The argument of Nye Jr. about the US spending less on soft power after the end of the Cold 
War seems to be plausible, since that war on soft power could be seen as won. Particularly Nye 
Jr.’s last statements raise questions that will be answered within this thesis, on which more later.  
Henry H. Sun in his article ‘International political marketing: a case study of US soft 
power and public diplomacy’, seems to agree with Nye Jr. that the soft power of the US had 
declined, according to him due to the foreign policy of the US.33 In contrast to Nye Jr., Sun 
claimed that already during the Cold War the US spent more money on, and paid more attention 
to, hard power than to soft power.34 Sun, however, also partly agree with Nye Jr. when arguing 
that “after the Cold War, the US government was more interested in budgets reduction than in 
increasing investment in its soft power”.35 Sun also agreed with Nye Jr. that the realization of 
the importance of soft power came back after the 9/11 terrorist attacks when the US foreign 
policymakers urged for higher budgets to cover up the gap in investment in soft power.36 Within 
his research, Sun looked into a case study on the decline of soft power and the Iraq War.37 Just 
as Nye Jr., Sun makes a plausible argument about the decreased spendings after the Cold War, 
with a decline of soft power as consequence. He, however, also investigates an interesting case. 
Again, this raises some questions, on which more later. 
Joshua Kurlantzick in his article ‘The Decline of American Soft Power’ claimed, just as 
Nye Jr. and Sun, that soft power of the US declined because of budget reducing after the Cold 
War and because of the Iraq War that “sharply reduced global acceptance of the legitimacy of 
America’s role in the world”.38 However, Kurlantzick also claimed that soft power declined 
because of the “poorly conceived security measures launched” after the 9/11 attacks, which 
made it harder to get a visa in the US.39 Therefore, the view of the US as “land of opportunity 
and refuge”, faded away.40 Kurlantzick argued that soft power declined in particular after the 
                                                          
30 Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 99. 
31 Ibid., 101. 
32 Nye Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 258. 
33 Sun, “International political marketing,” 178. 
34 Ibid., 175-176. 
35 Ibid., 176. 
36 Ibid., 176. 
37 Ibid., 176-181. 
38 Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Decline of American Soft Power,” Current History 104, no. 686 (2005), 420-421. 
39 Ibid., 421. 
40 Ibid., 421. 
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9/11 attack because of the “near-exclusive focus on terrorism”.41 Kurlantzick has a strong 
argument in coupling soft power to the 9/11 attacks. However, he only considers the Bush 
presidency and could therefore not consider the long-term consequences, which is a 
shortcoming. Besides that, Kurlantzick is focussed on the decline of soft power in general, via 
for example cultural attractiveness and business attractiveness, and not specifically focussed on 
the relationship between soft power and the war on terrorism. 
Since this thesis is also considering discourse, an interesting research is that of Richard 
Jackson who considered the language of the war on terrorism in his book Writing the War on 
Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism. Jackson considered the language 
regarding the war on terrorism as “designed to ‘sell’ the politics of counter-terrorism”, with the 
objective to “establish what counts as real knowledge”.42 Jackson claimed that “Once it is 
accepted that terrorism is really this dangerous, a global ‘war against terrorism’ on the scale 
and duration of the cold war appears perfectly reasonable”.43 Which is also shown within this 
thesis and therefore linked to soft power. Shortcoming of this research, however, is that Jackson 
considered the language of the war on terrorism but not how this related to soft power, he related 
it to political violence.44 Also, the book was published in 2005, which meant that the war on 
terrorism was just on the way and thus hardly no long-term trends could be observed. 
The above-mentioned literature shows that there has been quite some research regarding 
the decline of soft power of the US. However, the gap within the literature mentioned above 
seems to be the lack of literature regarding the link between the fluctuation of soft power and 
the whole foreign policy on the war on terrorism. The Iraq War is a frequently mentioned link 
between the decline of soft power and the war on terrorism. The standpoints of scholars 
mentioned in the literature review raised some questions. If soft power reached its lowest point 
during the Iraq War, how did it fluctuate before and after the Iraq War? How did soft power 
fluctuate after the marked turning point regarding soft power, according to the scholars, the 
9/11 attacks? This thesis is therefore considering the shift of soft power throughout the years 
before and after the Iraq War, for the whole period of the war on terrorism in the Bush and 
Obama presidency. Did soft power within the foreign policy on the war on terrorism maybe 
raise again a little, or did it even decline further? The Iraq War alone namely does not cover the 
whole foreign policy on the war on terrorism and has not shown the development of soft power 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 421. 
42 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), 178. 
43 Ibid., 120. 
44 Ibid., 180. 
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regarding the war on terrorism throughout the years. This last mentioned is another gap in the 
literature, presented in the literature review, this thesis will consider. Nye Jr. claimed in 2010 
that Obama’s election could cause possible fluctuation in soft power decline of the US in 
general.45 Therefore, this research considers the long-term development of soft power regarding 
the war on terrorism throughout the years of Obama and Bush. Jackson, as shown in the 
literature review, partly started by considering the Bush presidency regarding the language on 
the war on terrorism, although he did not couple it to soft power. However, this thesis will 
consider the long(er) term developments of two presidencies and their soft power regarding the 
war on terrorism. Additionally, not only discourse is considered, also allied support and polls 
to measure soft power are considered. 
                                                          
45 Parmar and Cox, Soft Power and US Foreign Policy, 222. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis will consider a within case study, namely US foreign 
policy on the war on terrorism. This research considers Bush and Obama because the war on 
terrorism started at president Bush and continued during Obama’s presidency. Donald Trump 
is not considered in this research, since his presidency just started. To answer the research 
question, three measurements are used: the discourse, allied support and polls. These are 
derived from Nye Jr.’s idea that soft power can be measured by “resources”, “behavioural 
outcomes” and polls.46 Resources are linked to the war on terrorism discourse, formed by 
speeches of Bush and Obama. The resource for soft power comes from within the country. One 
of the resources is, according to Nye Jr., the foreign policies of a country.47 Besides that, Nye 
Jr. claimed that soft power is “the ability to move people by argument”, the “ability to attract”, 
that “resources are the assets that produce such attraction” and that the resources of soft power 
are in large part produced by how a country expresses itself.48 With the discourse on the war on 
terrorism by Bush and Obama, it is shown how the US expresses itself and how attractive and 
convincing presidents tried to make this discourse.  
Secondly, the behavioural outcomes are linked to allied support regarding three specific 
events within the war on terrorism. The allied support, and thus the outcomes, are closely linked 
to the first measurement because “outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins but 
also by whose story wins”.49 Besides that, Nye Jr. claims that: “In behavioral terms, soft power 
is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such 
attraction”.50 The third measurement considers polls regarding the US and the war on terrorism. 
Although there are many other factors that could indicate soft power, such as cultural 
attraction, education, and international institutions, this research only considers above-
mentioned measurements.51 Mainly because this thesis needs a focus and because these are of 
importance to answer the research question. Looking at these measurements, it becomes clear 
that there is a distinction between statistic measurements and non-statistic measurements. Nye 
Jr. himself recognized this problem of measurement of soft power and concludes that each case 
must be judged on itself, which is the aim of this thesis.52 
                                                          
46 Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 95. 
47 Ibid., 96. 
48 Ibid., 95. 
49 Nye Jr., The Future of Power, 19. 
50 Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 95. 
51 Nye Jr., Bound to Lead, 188; Kurlantzick, “The Decline of American Soft Power,” 420. 
52 Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 95. 
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3.2. Method and data for the discourse 
Chapter four, the measurement of the discourse, answers the question: which of the presidents 
was more trying to make his discourse on the war on terrorism attractive and convincing? To 
answer this question, a political discourse analysis will be used. Political discourse can be used 
for “effectiveness and persuasion” to “emphasize or de-emphasize political attitudes and 
opinions, garner support, manipulate public opinion, manufacture political consent” and 
“legitimate political power”.53 For this research, based on this idea by Teun Van Dijk, it means 
that political discourse analysis shows how much the president wants to make its discourse on 
the war on terrorism attractive and convincing in order to reach its goal of soft power, namely: 
the same political attitudes and opinions for his ideas about the war on terrorism, support for 
his ideas, public opinion which agrees to his ideas and the legitimacy of his political ideas. If 
their discourse was convincing and attractive, or effective and persuaded as Van Dijk named it, 
they were able to move people by argument, as Nye Jr. described. 
The political discourse analysis focuses, according to Van Dijk, on the talk and text of 
“professional politicians or political institutions, such as presidenta and prime ministers and 
other members of government, parliament or political parties”.54 For this thesis, only the 
speeches of the presidents Bush and Obama are of relevance, even though other actors could 
also be of influence on the discourse regarding the war on terrorism. Bush and Obama are 
chosen because, according to Babb, “analysis usually focuses on specific individuals or groups 
who can reveal the nature of the discourse in their usage” and thus not focusing on, in this case, 
specific individuals will make the discourse analysis too complex.55 And because, according to 
Jackson: “The ‘war on terrorism’ is an elite-led project and these elites have provided the 
primary justifications and overall vision”.56 
Van Dijk mentions several factors that build a political discourse and thus how political 
discourse can be analysed. The factors that are relevant for this thesis are outlined here. Van 
Dijk mentions more factors, however, including these will not have an added value to this thesis. 
The first factors are the reflexive topics, that form the discourse.57 The second factors are 
strategies of “abstract, schematic forms, consisting of conventional categories that define their 
nature and the overall structure of the semantic ‘content’ (topics)”.58 First, the strategy of 
                                                          
53 Teun Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” Belgian Journal of Linguistics (1997): 25. 
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 Babb, Empirical Political Analysis, 358. 
56 Jackson, Writing the war on terrorism, 26. 
57 Van Dijk, “What is Political Discourse Analysis?,” 17, 25, 27. 
58 Ibid., 29. 
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argumentation in order to convince people, which is the explicit and implicit mention of 
assumptions as true facts to build the argument, further to the conclusion where it is clear 
because of the foregoing fallacies that the ‘other’ is not good and ‘our’ argument is good.59 The 
second strategy to convince is that of “Generalization and Specification, of Contrast and 
Example”.60 When ‘we’ do something bad it will be described as exception and it will be 
generalized, when ‘they’ do something bad it will be specified with examples.61 
The third factor is the so-called lexicon, “special words being used in politics”.62 For 
‘them’ negative words will be used, while for ‘us’ euphemisms and good words will be used.63 
This, in my opinion, to make the discourse more attractive, by making use of good words for 
‘us’, and convincing, by making use of bad words for ‘them’. The next factor is the so-called 
syntax, ways in which the meaning is expressed. In this thesis, the “use of pronouns” and 
variations in order are most important.64 The use of pronouns could convince people and could 
be of importance for inclusion and exclusion.65 Considering the order, something placed at the 
beginning is emphasized and gets extra attention.66 
Much could include political discourse: “propaganda, political advertising, political 
speeches, media interviews, political talk shows on TV, party programs, ballots, and so on”.67 
Only selected speeches which reached a wider public by Bush and Obama were selected to be 
analysed. These speeches reached national and international attention, which is important for 
the connection with the other two measurements. Besides that, a discourse analysis is not 
suitable for “large amounts of textual data”.68 Therefore, the selected speeches are: acceptance 
speeches, inauguration or re-election speeches, State of Union speeches, farewell speeches and 
speeches specifically about the war on terrorism. For the readability of this chapter, a code, as 
shown in the appendix, will be used when referencing to the speeches throughout chapter four. 
The letter ‘O’ refers to a speech by Obama, and ‘B’ to Bush, followed by the number of the 
concerned speech as shown in the appendix. This appendix also provides a full detailed 
overview of all the used speeches, which can also be found in the bibliography.  
                                                          
59 Ibid., 29-30. 
60 Ibid., 31. 
61 Ibid., 31-32. 
62 Ibid., 33. 
63 Ibid., 33. 
64 Ibid., 33. 
65 Ibid., 34. 
66 Ibid., 34. 
67 Ibid., 18. 
68 Babb, Empirical Political Analysis, 351. 
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3.2. Method and data for allied support 
In chapter five, the behavioural outcomes, the following question will be answered: what was 
the influence of US soft power on the decision of Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) to 
join (or not to join) a military operation as part of the war on terrorism? To find out what the 
role of soft power was and how it fluctuated throughout the years, a qualitative research method 
will be used to analyse the decision of those allies to join operations. This method will be 
applied to analyse government documents or statements, since they give the best view why 
governments decided to join an operation. The scope of this thesis is too limited to discuss all 
allies within the war on terrorism. Therefore, two allies are chosen (UK and Germany) to 
analyse their behavioural outcomes, their allied support, in joining three important operations 
within the war on terrorism (Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve). Those two countries were chosen since they, in my 
opinion, have an interesting position. The UK is one of the oldest and best allies of the US and 
therefore it is interesting to analyse to what extent soft power played a role in joining an 
operation. Germany is one of the biggest and most influential countries within Europe and it 
fluctuated in its alliance regarding the operations carried out within the war on terrorism. 
Besides that, those operations are chosen since they, in my opinion, represent important events 
within the war on terrorism. 
  
3.3. Method and data for polls 
The statistic measurement of polls, will consider the question: what did the allied countries 
think about the US and its foreign policy on the war on terrorism? A quantitative method, in 
combination with an interpretive method, will be used to interpret and analyse data from polls 
regarding the US and the war on terrorism. It is chosen to analyse polls from the UK and 
Germany in order to couple it to the first two measurements. This chapter mainly draws its data 
from Pew’s yearly Global Attitudes Survey. This survey collects the opinion of between 700 to 
1500 civilians from several countries almost each year.69 Analysis of the data retrieved from 
Pew is my interpretation and not an analysis provided by the institution. The analysed polls 
have a time span from 2001, the beginning of the war on terrorism during the Bush presidency, 
until 2016, the last measured year of Obama’s presidency. 
                                                          
69 Pew Research Center, “Methods – International Survey Research,” Pew Research Center, 2017, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/international-survey-research/.  
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4. The way Bush tried to make his war on terrorism discourse more convincing and 
attractive 
4.1. Introduction 
Bush and Obama used a different specific discourse to convince people of, and attract people 
to, their foreign policy regarding the war on terrorism. This chapter analyses the political 
discourse of the speeches with the factors of Van Dijk as described in the methodology chapter. 
It answers the following question: which of the presidents was more trying to make his 
discourse on the war on terrorism attractive and convincing? 
 
4.2. Reflexive topics of Bush and Obama 
Both Bush and Obama used allies as a reflexive topic and thus as a way to build their discourse 
on the war on terrorism. Throughout the years, Bush wanted to convince his allies that the war 
on terrorism was not just a matter for the US, since terrorists would also attack other countries 
and therefore the fight against terrorists was the responsibility of all allies.70 As he said during 
a speech in 2004, and already said in 2001: “Around the world, the nations must choose. They 
are with us, or they’re with the terrorists”.71 In this way he wanted to convince allies to join the 
war on terrorism. Throughout the years, Bush claimed during his speeches that he already had 
convinced allies to join his foreign policy on the war on terrorism and that he appreciated that.72 
Obama also wanted to convince allies to join the war on terrorism and was very grateful for 
those who joined.73 He also wanted to focus on building more partnerships using soft power 
diplomacy to defeat terrorism together, since the US was unable to do this on its own.74 
 The next reflexive topic is that of freedom/democracy and values, which were 
respectively used by Bush and Obama. Bush viewed the fight against terrorism as a fight for 
freedom and following democracy. He saw the war on terrorism as an ideological struggle in 
which the terrorists attacked the US because they were jealous and hateful of the freedom and 
democracy in the US, and therefore Bush wanted to protect freedom and democracy all over 
the world.75 Besides that, Bush was convinced that only democracy could stop terror.76 Where 
Bush was focussed on defending and spreading freedom and democracy whilst carrying out the 
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war on terrorism, Obama was focussed on protecting and spreading values, among which 
freedom and democracy.77 Obama claimed that although terrorists do not act according to 
values, it was important that ‘we’ do while fighting them.78 In that way, the US could function 
as an example and the values can be spread further, in order for other countries to have the will 
to cooperate with the US to fight terrorism.79  
 Both Bush and Obama believed in a leading role of the US in fighting terrorism. Bush 
was convinced that only the US could lead this war on terrorism successfully, and that others 
wanted the US to lead, since it was the world power.80 Obama was also convinced that only the 
US could lead the war on terrorism, since it was the world’s leading power.81 But also because 
of US values and ideals.82 He was convinced that “our security and leadership depends on all 
elements of our power – including strong and principled diplomacy”.83 Obama was, however, 
in contrast to Bush, also looking inwards, because only when a country is internally in order, it 
could lead externally in the war on terrorism.84 
 The next reflexive topic is that of a winnable war for Bush and an end to the war for 
Obama. Bush, throughout the years, repeatedly mentioned that the war on terrorism, and the 
military actions carried out under this name, was winnable and that ‘we’ were winning this war 
on terrorism.85 Not only due to previous wars showing that the US wins.86 Also because Bush 
designed new strategies and tactics to face this new kind of war and threat of terrorism, for 
example, among others, the not defensive attitude of the US.87 Considering Obama, he aimed 
to end the war and to end not carrying out ‘our’ values due to the war on terrorism, for example 
by closing Guantanamo Bay or by being non-transparent.88 
 The fifth reflexive topic, used by both Bush and Obama, was that of hunting down 
terrorists. Bush claimed that not only the terrorists of Al Qaeda, responsible for the 9/11 attacks, 
needed to be hunted down, but all terrorists.89 Obama was, however, more focussed on hunting 
down the terrorists responsible for attacking or directly threatening the US.90 
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 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are another reflexive topic. According to Bush, both 
countries harboured terrorists and provided them with weapons, possibly WMD.91 Therefore, 
hard power, military action, was needed because soft power was no longer effective.92 Bush 
believed that the costs of those wars were justified by all the good things done by the US and 
allies and all good things about to happen in the future.93 Bush was convinced that Afghanistan 
and Iraq could function as an example for the Middle East.94 After the terrorists were defeated, 
the US would “help new leaders to train their armies, and move toward elections, and get on 
the path of stability and democracy as quickly as possible”.95 In order for those countries to 
never “be a safe haven for terrorists” again.96 Therefore, Bush did not want to set a timetable 
for leaving those countries, because it could work against the US in reaching its goals, helping 
the enemy instead.97 Obama, on the contrary, set dates when troops leave Afghanistan and Iraq 
and made clear he wanted to end those wars.98 However, in the case of Afghanistan, he was 
convinced that sending more troops was needed to fight the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 
attacks, and to end the war.99 Obama wanted to end the wars because, as mentioned earlier, he 
wanted a more inward-looking perspective, which includes being transparent about the material 
and human costs of these wars.100 
 The fight against ISIL in Syria and Iraq was a part of the war on terrorism only carried 
out by Obama. Bush, however, mentioned it slightly during his State of the Union Address in 
2005: “Syria still allows its territory, and parts of Lebanon, to be used by terrorists who seek to 
destroy every chance of peace in the region. (…) and we expect the Syrian government to end 
all support for terror and open the door to freedom”.101 This was a shared fear by Obama, that 
besides ISIL, the Syrian government provided terrorists a safe have and weapons, even possibly 
WMD.102 Obama, however, knew starting another war after ending Afghanistan and Iraq would 
not be received enthusiastically. Therefore, he promised no American troops in Syria; he only 
supported troops and led a coalition carrying out targeted airstrikes fighting ISIL.103 
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4.3. Strategies more used by Bush in general and used by Obama on more reflexive topics 
The first strategy is that of argumentation using assumptions, to convince people of the 
conclusion. Bush used this strategy often to convince people of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. By making assumptions, told as facts, about the actions of terrorists or terrorist supporting 
states and what the assumed consequences were if the US would not intervene or would not 
have intervened.104 Additionally, for his discourse that the wars could not be ended, Bush made 
many assumptions about what could go wrong when troops pulled out.105 He made those 
assumptions sound like consequences surely to happen. Obama made less use of this strategy. 
One noteworthy exception was regarding the sending of more troops into Afghanistan, where 
he made assumptions about the situation in Afghanistan and what could go wrong if not more 
troops were sent there.106 
 Bush also frequently used the strategy of generalization, specification and contrast, 
example. To convince people that the war in Iraq was needed, Bush specified the mistakes Iraq 
made and gave endless examples of those mistakes.107 He also specified and gave examples of 
all the good things the US and allies did regarding the war in Iraq.108 The same happened 
regarding Afghanistan.109 Bush, however, made less use of the generalization and contrast 
function of this strategy. When WMD were not discovered in Iraq, Bush generalized this and 
put it into contrast to all the good things done within Iraq.110 Obama, on the other hand, used 
this strategy on more different reflexive topics. Obama, like Bush, specified all the good things 
US and allies did within Afghanistan and Iraq with examples.111 He also gave a lot of examples 
of all the bad things ‘they’ did.112 Obama also wanted to convince people of his more soft power 
diplomacy approach, which he also did by giving many examples throughout the years.113 In 
addition, Obama tried to convince people of the fight against ISIL, with specified examples of 
all their wrongful actions, and all the right actions of the US and allies.114 Obama also used the 
function of generalization and contrast less. Mistakes made by the US and bad things happened 
within Afghanistan were generalized and contrasted with good things that happened.115 
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4.4. Lexicon less used by Obama in comparison to Bush 
From analysing the speeches, it became clear that Bush made much more use of the separation 
between ‘us’ as ‘good’ and ‘them’ as ‘bad’, compared to Obama. To convince people of his 
reflexive topic of hunting down terrorists, Bush used mostly negative words for terrorists such 
as: “the enemy”116, “parasites”117, “thugs and killers”118 and “the guilty”119. For the 9/11 attacks 
he used negative words such as “evil act”, “when freedom came under attack” and “the attack 
on freedom in our world”.120 The last could not only convince people about his reflexive topic 
of hunting down terrorists, but also about his reflexive topic of freedom. Obama, on the 
contrary, made use of more neutral terms to describe the 9/11 terrorist attacks, just “the 9/11 
attacks” or “9/11”.121 Although he hardly used any obvious negative words to describe the 
attacks, he did use negative words to describe terrorists: “a far-reaching network of violence 
and hatred”122, “twisted souls”123 and “violent fanatics”124. However, he used those words less 
compared to Bush. The highly negative words used by Bush regarding terrorists and their 
actions were used structurally and focused on throughout the analysed speeches, which was less 
the case considering Obama’s speeches. 
To convince people of his reflexive topic of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush used 
language to show those states that support terrorism were ‘bad’, by calling them “axis of 
evil”125, “enemies of freedom”126 or “sectarian”127. To convince people of the war in Iraq 
specifically, Bush used negative words for the leader in Iraq, such as: “the dictator”, “the 
tyrant”, “the lawless men who rule your country” or “a brutal dictatorship”.128 Obama’s 
language is comparable to Bush’s language. Obama called countries that supported terrorism 
“extremist allies”129 and “sectarian”130, and the leader of Iraq was called a “tyrant”131.  
Bush used the ‘we’ are ‘good’ and ‘they’ are ‘bad’ construction, with respectively positive 
and negative language and choice of words and adjectives, a lot to convince people of his ideas 
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about the ‘bad’ Afghanistan and Iraq and the ‘good’ deeds of ‘us’ in Afghanistan and Iraq.132 
Compared to Bush, who aimed to communicate a contradiction, Obama had a more neutral 
language regarding this topic and although he was contradictory at times, it was in a lesser 
amount.133 He, however, used negative words regarding the costs of the war, to convince people 
of his idea regarding the end of the war.134 Additionally, he used lexicon regarding the reflexive 
topic of the fight against ISIL. The good things the US and allies did to fight ISIL were brought 
with positive words, for them to be attractive and convincing of the ‘goodness’ of the deeds.135 
Coupled to the reflexive topic of allies, Bush used positive words for allies. They were 
called “friends”136, “partner” or “ally” in the war against terror137, and, coupled to the reflexive 
topic of freedom, “allies of freedom”.138 This was the same for Obama, calling allies “friends”, 
“partners” and “partnerships”.139 
 
4.5. Syntax more used by Bush in comparison to Obama 
To see whether the war on terrorism is mentioned at the beginning, and thus extra emphasize 
was given to communicate a certain importance, the beginning of speeches which were not in 
particular related to the war on terrorism (State of the Union Addresses, Inauguration Addresses 
and Farewell Addresses) are considered. Bush started, although sometimes only slightly 
mentioned, seven of the nine speeches with a topic relating to the war on terrorism, whereas 
Obama started, whether or not slightly mentioned, five out of ten speeches.140 
 Another part of syntax analysed within this research, the use of pronouns, was much 
more used by Bush compared to Obama. As demonstrated by the lexicon, Bush aimed to 
emphasize the contradiction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and thereby causing the feeling of 
inclusion and exclusion, to make his discourse attractive and convincing. Therefore, he used 
pronouns regularly and repeatedly to exclude ‘them’ as ‘bad’, and include ‘us’ as ‘good’. Where 
‘they’ were terrorists or the countries that support terrorism that did ‘wrong’ and ‘we’ were the 
US and its allies that did ‘good’ and will do things ‘good’ in the future if Bush’s plans were 
executed.141 To include people, Bush made use of pronouns and word combinations. For 
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example, “our nation”, “our country” or “our allies”.142 The same is happening with ‘our’ in 
combination with ‘enemy’ or ‘enemies’.143 To include ‘us’ and exclude ‘them’. Obama made 
less frequent use of pronouns to convince people of, and attract people to, his discourse. Obama, 
just as Bush, had the intention to create inclusion by making use of ‘we’ followed by his ideas 
about things that needed to happen.144 However, unlike Bush, he tended to exclude less often. 
Just as Bush, Obama used the combination “our nation”.145 This is explainable since, as 
mentioned earlier, Obama was more focussed on the nation instead of looking externally. 
However, Obama also used the combination of ‘our’ and ‘allies’ more than Bush did.146 
Furthermore, due to the less frequent use of the ‘them’ part to exclude people as said before, 
Obama also made lesser use of the combination ‘our’ with ‘enemies’.147 Lastly, it is noteworthy 
that an often-seen combination from Obama is that of ‘our’ and ‘values’, to convince people of 
his reflexive topic of values.148 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter focussed on the discourse about the war on terrorism. Central this chapter was the 
question: which of the presidents was more trying to make his discourse on the war on terrorism 
attractive and convincing? The reflexive topics illustrate the discourse both presidents had 
regarding the foreign policy on the war on terrorism. How convincing and attractive they tried 
to tell this is shown by the factors of strategies, lexicon and syntax. 
The several reflexive topics by Bush and Obama show their ideas, and thus the discourse 
they wanted to share, related to the war on terrorism. Considering those reflexive topics, both 
presidents wanted to hunt down terrorists. However, where Bush focused on a broad category 
of terrorists, Obama focussed on the terrorists responsible for attacking or directly threatening 
the US. Obama’s discourse seemed friendlier, compared to Bush, towards allied countries. 
Obama overall seemed less war orientated than Bush was, since he proclaimed to end wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Bush, on the other hand, only wanted to win wars and make sure 
democracy would be established to deny terrorists a safe haven. Both presidents were anxious 
about any weak state providing terrorists with WMD. Values were important for both 
presidents, however, Obama did not only want to spread them, as Bush did, but also carry them 
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out within the war on terrorism. Besides that, Obama wanted the country internally in order and 
lead externally, whilst Bush was more focussing on leading externally. 
Bush and Obama tried to make this discourse convincing with the use of several 
strategies. Regarding argumentation by assumption, Bush made more use of this strategy than 
Obama did. The second strategy, generalization, specification and contrast, example, was used 
more by Bush in comparison to Obama. Overall, Obama used it on more reflexive topics. 
Secondly, considering lexicon, Bush used considerably more negative words for ‘them’ 
than Obama did. Both presidents used positive words for allies, to make the discourse more 
attractive for those allies. Bush, in comparison to Obama, also made more use of negative 
language and adjectives to convince people of the good/bad contradiction and therefore his 
reflexive topics. 
Lastly, this chapter considered the use of syntax. Bush, in comparison to Obama, started 
more analysed speeches by referring to the war on terrorism. He wanted to increase the attention 
on the subject. Besides that, Bush also made more use of pronouns: to include certain people 
and attract them to his discourse, and to exclude the ‘bad’ people which could function as a 
convincing factor for the included ‘good’ people. 
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5. Germany’s shifting support and UK’s remaining support for the war on terrorism 
operations 
5.1. Introduction 
The second measurement of Nye Jr. to measure soft power are the behavioural outcomes. One 
of the most important behavioural outcomes within the war on terrorism is the allied support. 
This is the case when the US asked allies to help fighting terrorists or terrorist supporting 
bodies. Therefore, the question is: what was the influence of US soft power on the decision of 
Germany and the UK to join (or not to join) a military operation as part of the war on terrorism? 
 
5.2. Germany and UK supportive in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan started right after the attacks of 9/11 when Bush 
ordered the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden, the main actor behind the 9/11 attacks, 
which the Taliban refused. Furthermore, the Taliban refused to remove Al Qaeda, bin Laden’s 
network, from Afghanistan. On October 7th, 2001, the US, together with the UK, started 
airstrikes, to hit military targets and destroy training camps from Al Qaeda and Taliban.149 On 
September 12th, 2001, NATO invoked the 9/11 attacks an Article V of the collective defence 
clause where “an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies”.150 
 The UK supported Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as designed by the US 
from the start. According to a British policy paper about Afghanistan: “When the Taliban 
refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, we joined the US and many other nations to bring Al 
Qaeda’s leaders to justice, remove the Taliban from control in Afghanistan and prevent the 
country from again becoming a safe haven for terrorists”.151 This statement directly 
correspondents with Bush’s discourse as shown in chapter four: hunting down terrorists and no 
safe haven for them in Afghanistan. The UK sent troops to Afghanistan with the aim “to protect 
our national security by helping the Afghans take control of their own. We are helping the 
Afghan government to develop its ability to maintain security, so that it can prevent the return 
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of international terrorists, such as Al-Qaeda, to Afghanistan”.152 The UK seemed to follow and 
carry out the US policy on Afghanistan. This is enhanced by the following statement from a 
policy paper by the British government: “Working with the US and other international partners, 
the UK went to Afghanistan to remove Al-Qaeda strongholds and to prevent their return. As a 
result, the terrorist threat to the UK from this region has been substantially reduced” and: 
“without the international investment and commitment to Afghanistan since 2001, the country 
would have been unimaginably worse off, and international terrorists would have been 
increasingly free to use it as a safe haven to launch attacks against the UK and its allies”.153 It 
directly refers to the US, and only indirectly refers to other international partners, implying 
additional emphasis on the US as the country’s main partner. Additionally, it is emphasised 
that, from the start, UK’s military activity was about hunting down terrorists and making sure 
Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for international terrorists, similar to the reflexive topics 
within Bush’s discourse. 
 Germany decided to join Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan partly because it 
became clear that the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, was tolerating Al Qaeda.154 
Germany not only joined for the safety of the Afghan people, but also for the safety of the 
German people since Al Qaeda formed a threat to German national security.155 Additionally, 
NATO qualified the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an attack against all NATO members according to 
Article V, which implied that Germany had to join the operation.156 It therefore might have felt 
obligated to join. Nevertheless, Germany was concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. 
Germany hosted the first international Afghan conference which laid the foundation for United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1386, through which the International Security 
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Assistance Force (ISAF) was created.157 Germany joined under ISAF leadership and joined to 
provide security, stability, and to support and train Afghan forces in order for them to know 
how to resist the terrorists safe havens in their country and prevent terrorist activity.158 Contrary 
to the US and the UK who had been focussed on attacking in the beginning, Germany was 
focussing on other factors at first and therefore called it a stabilization mission.159 However, 
with the same aim of hunting down terrorists and refusing them a safe haven in Afghanistan. 
 
5.3. Shifting support from Germany in Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq 
According to Bush, the supposed possession of WMD of Iraq were dangerous, because Iraq 
supported terrorist organizations, among which also Al Qaeda, and therefore Iraq needed to be 
disarmed. He claimed that Iraq was not cooperating with United Nations (UN) inspections 
regarding the WMD and thus, gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 
hours.160 When it appeared that Hussein had not left Iraq, the US together with, among others, 
the UK, began to carry out targeted airstrikes on March 20th, 2003, followed within days with 
an invasion by US and UK troops.161 
 The role of the UK within Operation Iraqi Freedom was substantive from the start. The 
cabinet decided on March 17th, 2003, with the approval of the Parliament a day after, to join the 
operation of military action as outlined by the US from the beginning onwards.162 It is stated 
that Prime Minister Tony Blair had to convince the House of Commons for them to agree.163 
Before that, already on July 28th, 2002, Blair let Bush know he supported his ideas regarding 
Iraq, when he wrote in a note: “I will be with you, whatever”.164 This was in particular the view 
of Blair, who found the support an “essential demonstration of solidarity with the UK’s 
principal ally”.165 This means that the decisions considering Iraq were formed by the 
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relationship between the UK and the US.166 The UK was concerned “that vital areas of co-
operation between the UK and the US could be damaged if the UK did not give the US its full 
support over Iraq”.167 The UK therefore had to change its perspective from (peacefully) 
disarming Iraq, towards disarming Iraq and a regime change as the US wanted.168 The US 
accepted the wanted path of the UK via the UN for a while, before putting its own timetable for 
military action forward towards the UK, wherefore the UK bowed.169 It is claimed that it was 
Blair’s strong will to have a good alliance with the US that made him ask the parliament “to 
endorse a decision to invade and occupy a sovereign nation, without the support of a Security 
Council resolution explicitly authorising the use of force”.170 Other reasons to join were the fear 
of WMD and fear for terrorist attacks.171 
Germany’s position was different. Contrasting the UK, the German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder did not agree on the claimed non-cooperation of Iraq with UN inspectors and wanted 
to give Iraq more time to show cooperation. Therefore, Schröder wanted to withstand Bush’s 
48 hour ultimatum.172 Schröder made clear that he did not agree the UN legitimizing the 
invasion in Iraq.173 Germany wanted to peacefully disarm Iraq, which meant that the UN 
inspectors had to do their work instead of making them the work impossible by starting a war.174 
Besides that, Schröder was convinced that invading Iraq would only motivate terrorists instead 
of defeat them, since it could form a risk for the dialogue with the Islamic countries.175 Although 
Bush was pressing the German government to join the operation, the German government did 
not change its opinion.176 As the German Minister of Foreign Affairs said: “I am not 
convinced”.177 Schröder made clear that if the operation was NATO-led, Germany would have 
taken its responsibility.178 
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5.4. Germany and the UK both supportive in Operation Inherent Resolve in Syria and Iraq 
A group of regional Islamist militias who combined their forces in Syria and Iraq became 
known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or, otherwise named, the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIL is seen as the successor of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the group as such 
was a split off from Al Qaeda.179 At first, the US-led mission against ISIL had no official name. 
The air strikes began in August 2014, and spread to Syria a month later, while the mission was 
named the Combined Joined Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve only mid October 
2014.180 The goal of the operation was to defeat ISIL, military and ideologically.181 This was 
done by airstrikes to destroy ISIL’s infrastructure and military capabilities; by assisting partner 
ground troops logistically; by providing observations for partner ground troops; and by 
supporting and training Iraqi forces, Kurdish forces and Syrian opposition.182 
 At the beginning, the UK did not want to fight ISIL with military means. Although the 
threat of ISIL was clear, the Foreign Secretary of the UK said in June 2014 that although the 
UK would support anything the US decided to do in fighting ISIL, “the UK will not get involved 
militarily”.183 Where the UK did not want to join militarily, it also kept its options open to 
support the US when needed, which is again a sign of soft power of the US. This continued 
towards more support to the US on September 5th, 2014, when the Foreign Secretary stated 
“that while the UK currently does not participate in airstrikes alongside the US, the possibility 
of taking part would remain under consideration”.184 The UK joined within the same month 
even before the operation had an official name.185 It is claimed that this military action resulted 
from “The substantial gains made by ISIS in recent months, which saw their forces advance on 
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the northern city of Irbil and forced thousands of people from religious minorities to flee their 
homes, prompted the US, UK and other governments to take more concerted action in Iraq”.186 
This meant that a humanitarian disaster was given as one of the reasons for the UK to join the 
military operations. Besides that, another reason provided was that the UK “further recognises 
the threat ISIL poses to wider international security and the UK directly through its sponsorship 
of terrorist attacks and its murder of a British hostage”.187 Therefore the UK decided to join 
militarily action, and thus air strikes, in Iraq and later also in Syria.188 This while they initially 
did not want to join military action, but also kept its options open not to offend the US. As 
Prime Minister David Cameron said during a joint press conference with Obama: “As leaders, 
we share the same values and, as you said, on so many issues, we see the world in the same 
way” and, regarding this seeing the world in the same way, Cameron said: “Now, Britain and 
America both face threats to our national security from people who hate what our countries 
stand for and who are determined to do us harm”.189 Which really illustrates the soft power of 
the US for UK’s decision to join the operation. Besides the military action, however, the UK 
had a less offensive role in Iraq in training, assisting and helping logically and with resources 
the Iraqi and Kurdish forces, which started already before the first air strikes carried out by the 
UK.190 Where the UK was only focussing on the Iraqi forces, on request by the US, it decided 
that it would also train Syrian forces outside of Syria within countries part of the global coalition 
against ISIL.191 Again, soft power of the US is illustrated. 
 Germany joined the operation partly from August 2014 onwards, and partly militarily 
since December 2015 onwards.192 It is training and providing material to the Kurdish and Iraqi 
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forces.193 Additionally, Germany provides humanitarian help towards Iraqi and Kurdish 
people.194 Although Germany does not provide air strikes, it does provide some air support, 
such as an air refuelling plane and planes for surveillance and intelligence.195 Moreover, a 
German frigate is protecting the French aircraft carrier, when the aircraft carrier is present, from 
which French air force is carrying out air strikes against ISIL.196 Besides that, Germany chairs, 
together with the United Arab Emirates, a working group which is concerned with 
reconstruction and stabilization of the area and the reconciliation of several groups within the 
area.197 One of the reasons that those actions were decided upon, was because of the 
humanitarian disaster ISIL was causing in the region and therefore it had to be stopped as soon 
as possible.198 Therefore, Germany joined the operation from the beginning when the US asked 
for a coalition.199 However, military assistance in the air was decided after the terrorist attacks 
in Paris on the 13th of November 2015. Germany thereafter claimed that it had to support France 
and the international coalition militarily as well.200 The reason why Germany decided to join 
the military fight against ISIL is because France asked them to and because of the threat for 
peace and international security from ISIL.201 It is noteworthy that Germany mentioned France 
and the international coalition, in comparison to the UK who referred, as shown earlier, to the 
US and the international coalition. Germany claimed from the beginning that the coalition is 
predominantly military focussed and therefore it wanted to provide a role focusing on the 
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humanitarian aspect, as shown above, and focus on fighting the ideology of ISIL with for 
example the help of Muslim intellectuals and politicians.202 Germany did not want to join the 
operation because it wanted to follow US policy, but because it thought it was useful if every 
country fulfilled its specific role which is within their capabilities and combine their specialist 
powers and capabilities to fight ISIL.203  
 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter considered the influence of US soft power on the decision of Germany and the UK 
to join (or not to join) in a war on terrorism military operation. Considering Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan, the UK supported the US from the start. With the reasons that 
correspond to the discourse of Bush as shown in the fourth chapter of this thesis. The UK 
believed the discourse of its strong ally about the situation in Afghanistan. Which was quite 
different for Germany, who felt attracted to the discourse of Bush when joining the operation, 
it however may also have felt the obligation to join because of Article V. Germany followed 
the policy of ISAF and was therefore focussing on stabilization from the start. In comparison 
to the UK joining from the beginning under US policy and therefore being focussed on attacking 
initially, and stabilization later.  
Considering Operation Iraqi Freedom, US soft power was again of influence on the UK 
joining. Although the UK wanted to work through the UN, it changed its strategy when it bowed 
for the policy of the US and it joined the operation from the start. This is explainable by the 
fear for terrorist attacks, but also by the strong ties between Bush and Blair, and the UK and the 
US in general. Germany, on the contrary, was not convinced by the discourse used about WMD 
and Iraq. Even though Bush was trying to convince Germany, US soft power was not strong 
enough and Germany refused to join the operation. 
Both countries joined Operation Inherent Resolve. Again, the soft power of the US was 
important for the UK to join. Where the UK did not want to join the operation militarily in the 
beginning, it also did not want to offend the US. Although humanitarian reasons and reasons of 
fear for ISIL were given, it was also clear that the ties and the shared values between the UK 
and the US played a role for the UK joining the operation militarily and non-militarily. 
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Germany, on the contrary, is mainly focussing on the non-militarily part of the operation from 
the beginning. Where the US could not convince them to join partly militarily, France could. 
After the terrorist attacks in Paris and on the request of France, Germany decided to partly join 
militarily besides its non-militarily parts in the operation.  
This chapter demonstrates that the soft power from the US towards the UK was of influence 
for the UK to join military operations. Germany was not that influenced by the soft power of 
the US. In Afghanistan they joined under ISAF leadership, they did not join in Iraq and they 
only joined partly militarily in the fight against ISIL after France asked them and was mainly 
focused from the beginning on the non-military part of the operation. 
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6. Fluctuation in the polls within Germany and the UK regarding the US and war on 
terrorism 
6.1. Introduction 
To identify how people thought about the US and the war on terrorism, and thus to consider the 
last measurement by Nye Jr., this chapter analyses polls throughout the years from Germany 
and the UK and answers the following question: what did the allied countries think about the 
US and its foreign policy on the war on terrorism? 
 
6.2. A better view of the US and the US president during the Obama presidency 
The way a country is viewed is important for soft power. The percentage of questioned British 
who saw the US favourable declined throughout the years during Bush’s presidency, where 
after the favourability rose again when Obama came into power. However, as the years 
progressed, less questioned British maintained a favourable view of the US, until 2014, where 
it rose slightly again. The questioned Germans overall had a less favourable view of the US, 
compared to the questioned British. Similarly to the UK, in Germany the people who favoured 
the US fell throughout the years Bush was in power and rose when Obama came into power. 
Again, as Obama’s years progressed, less questioned Germans saw the US favourably.204 Figure 
one illustrates that after Obama was inaugurated as president of the US, the percentage of 
questioned British and Germans who favoured the US rose in comparison to the previous year 
of Bush’s presidency. Moreover, the US gained an overall more favourable view during the 
Obama presidency compared to the Bush presidency. On top of that, the questioned British 
overall had a more favoured view of the US in comparison to questioned Germans. Only in 
2010 and 2011 both countries marked around the same percentage. 
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Figure 1: Favourability of the US in Germany and the UK 
Source: Pew Research Center Global Attitudes & Trends205  
 
Not only the way a country is viewed, but also how its president is perceived is of 
importance for soft power. It is not conducive for soft power if people have no confidence in 
the president of the US. The amount of questioned British who had confidence in Bush, fell 
from 2003 onwards. This strongly increased when Obama came into power and fluctuated 
slightly from then onwards. The amount of questioned Germans who had confidence in Bush 
was also declining throughout the years, and was even lower than the questioned British the 
same years. The moment Obama came into power, the questioned Germans who had confidence 
in Obama strongly increased and fell slightly from then onwards, until it rose again in 2016, 
Obama’s last year in power.206 As figure two illustrates, the number of British respondents 
having confidence in president Bush was higher compared to Germany. During the Obama 
presidency, it was the other way around (except for 2014 and 2015). Noteworthy is that in both 
countries, a larger percentage of respondents had confidence in Obama compared to Bush. 
Additionally, just as with the US favourability, this percentage had strongly risen the moment 
Obama came into power. 
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Figure 2: Confidence in the US president in Germany and the UK 
Source: Pew Research Center Global Attitudes & Trends207 
 
Soft power is also about influence. In 2008 and 2009 people were asked: “Overall, how 
much influence do you think the United States is having on the way things are going in our 
country?”208 Those who answered a great deal or a fair amount were questioned whether this 
was a good thing or not.209 Polls indicate that more questioned Germans and British saw the 
great deal or fair amount of US influence and power as a good thing during Obama’s presidency 
compared to Bush’s presidency. Overall, however, US power and influence was not seen as 
something good. 40% in 2008 and 30% in 2009 of the British respondents thought the US had 
a great deal of influence. And 48% in 2008 and 51% in 2009 a fair amount. Of those, 13% in 
2008 and 19% in 2009 thought this was a good thing. Of the questioned Germans, 40% in 2008 
and 33% in 2009 answered a great deal. And 48% in 2008 and 50% in 2009 a fair amount. Of 
those 12% in 2008 and 23% in 2009 thought this was a good thing.210 The influence of the US 
on the UK when joining operations, as shown in chapter five, is therefore seen as something 
bad by the questioned British in 2008 and 2009. 
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6.3. More soft power regarding the war on terrorism within the Obama presidency 
Soft power is also depending on how much people like the carrying out of the war on terrorism. 
From 2002 until 2012 (except for 2008), British and Germans were asked: “And which comes 
closer to describing your view? I favour the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism, OR I oppose the 
U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism”.211 Polls indicate a rise of questioned Germans and British 
who favoured the US-led efforts to fight terrorism between 2007 and 2009, the last measured 
year of Bush’s presidency and the first measured year of Obama’s presidency. 49% of the 
questioned British favoured the US-led efforts to fight terrorism in 2007, and 64% of the 
questioned British did this in 2009. From Germans respondents, only 42% favoured the US-led 
efforts to fight terrorism, which rose to 68% in 2009.212 This could be explained by Obama 
implementing another discourse, as shown in chapter four, and policy on how to fight terrorism 
compared to Bush. However, the percentage of questioned Germans and British who favoured 
the US-led efforts to fight terrorism also fell during Obama’s presidency. Still, most favourable 
respondents in both countries had been during Obama’s presidency.213  
Soft power is also dependable on the credibility of the discourse regarding the war on 
terrorism, and how convincing this discourse is. In 2004 Pew asked: “Do you think the U.S. led 
war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism or don’t you believe 
that?”.214 51% of the questioned British and 29% of the questioned Germans answered that it 
was a sincere effort.215 When the questioned Germans who answered not sincere or both had to 
name other important reasons for the US-led fight against terrorism most Germans answered to 
control oil in the Middle East.216 The majority of questioned Germans (52%) had already 
provided this answer as motive for possible military action against Iraq in 2002.217 This implies 
that way more questioned British believed the discourse used by, at that time, Bush about the 
war on terrorism, namely that it was to reduce international terrorism. The majority of the 
questioned Germans however, did not believe this, and saw the control of oil as important 
reason. 
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Part of the war on terrorism were actions taken in Afghanistan and opinions on this are 
important when considering soft power linked to the war on terrorism. In 2002, most questioned 
Germans and British approved the war in Afghanistan, 73% of the British and 61% of the 
Germans.218 Polls indicate, however, that this changed throughout the years and the discourse 
on this war in Afghanistan became less attractive, when asked from 2007 to 2011: “Do you 
think the U.S. and NATO should keep military troops in Afghanistan until the situation has 
stabilized, or do you think the U.S. and NATO should remove their troops as soon as 
possible?”.219 Where in 2007 45% of the questioned British answered that the US and NATO 
should keep troops in Afghanistan, this fell to 41% in 2011. Of the questioned Germans, 44% 
answered that US and NATO should remove troops in 2007, and, just as the questioned British, 
41% of the questioned Germans thought the same in 2011.220 This shows that a minority of the 
questioned Germans and British wanted NATO and the US to keep troops in Afghanistan, 
which makes the discourse by Bush unattractive. While the discourse by Obama of removing 
troops and ending the war, after he decided to send more troops, was probably more attractive. 
In 2009 41% of the questioned British and 32% of the questioned Germans approved Obama’s 
discourse to send more troops into Afghanistan.221 Polls show that sending more troops to 
Afghanistan was an unattractive part of Obama’s discourse, however, polls also point out that 
his reflexive topic of ending the war in Afghanistan was attractive. 
 Another part of the war on terrorism was the operation in Iraq. Before the Iraq War, the 
majority view was unfavourable. Only 47% in 2002 and 39% in 2003 of the questioned British 
would favour the UK joining military action against Iraq together with the US and allies.222 In 
Germany, 26% in 2002 and 27% in 2003 of the respondents would favour military action in 
Iraq by the US and allies.223 Polls show that a majority of the British respondents did not support 
the UK joining military action in Iraq, and that a majority of the questioned British, against 
their government, were not convinced by Bush’s discourse about Iraq. Also questioned 
Germans were, just as their governments, not convinced by Bush’s discourse about Iraq. 
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Therefore, it seems logical that the questioned Germans supported the government’s 
decision not to join the operation in 2003, as demonstrated in chapter five. In 2003 80% of the 
questioned Germans thought it was the right decision not to join the military force in Iraq. This 
number was 86% in 2004 and 87% in 2005.224 On the contrary, a minority of the questioned 
British saw the decision to join military force in Iraq as positive. In 2003 61%, 2004 43% and 
2005 39% of the questioned British thought it was the right decision to join military force in 
Iraq.225 This indeed implies that a great majority of the questioned Germans supported the 
decision taken by the German government. This was not the case in the UK, where in 2003 a 
majority supported government’s decision, this fell to a minority in 2004 and 2005. 
 A year after the start of the Iraq War, in 2004, Pew asked many questions regarding the 
war in Iraq which demonstrates bad influence on the soft power of the US. 69% of the 
questioned Germans thought that the leaders of the UK and the US lied about WMD “to provide 
a reason for invading Iraq”, while most questioned British, 48%, thought that the “leaders were 
themselves misinformed by bad intelligence” about WMD.226 58% and 82% of the respectively 
questioned British and Germans said they had less confidence in the trustworthiness of the US 
after starting the war in Iraq.227 Besides that, 50% of the questioned British and 58% of the 
questioned Germans thought the war in Iraq had hurt the war on terrorism.228 
 Part of Bush’s discourse about the war in Iraq was that he could not set an end date for 
troops to leave, since it would help the enemy. Polls show that this discourse by Bush was 
unattractive for questioned British and Germans. In 2007, 38% of the questioned British and 
23% of the questioned Germans thought that the US needed to keep troops in Iraq, a majority 
answered the other option, that the US should remove the troops as soon as possible.229 Where 
Bush’s discourse was unattractive in 2007, Obama’s discourse on removing troops from Iraq 
was attractive in 2009 where 85% of the questioned British and 81% of the questioned Germans 
approved the plan of the US withdrawing troops from Iraq.230  
Polls show that the discourse by Bush of Iraq functioning as an example for the Middle 
East after Hussein was removed, was not convincing enough. In 2003 7% and 2004 3% of the 
questioned Germans answered the Middle East would become much more democratic with 
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removing Hussein and 59% in 2003 and 45% in 2004 of the questioned Germans answered that 
it would make the Middle East somewhat more democratic. Of the questioned British, 16% in 
2003 and 12% in 2004 answered much more democratic and 44% in 2003 and 35% in 2004 
answered somewhat more democratic.231 
Building on that, one of the reasons why the war in Iraq took place, according to the 
discourse by Bush and later partly by Obama, was to establish a stable government which did 
not harbour terrorists. From 2006 to 2010, a small majority of the questioned British responded 
that establishing a democratic government would definitely or probably succeed in 2006, which 
fell to a small minority in 2010. Of the questioned Germans, already in 2006, a great minority 
believed this would definitely or probably succeed, which fell even further when looking to the 
last time it was asked in 2010.232 The questioned Germans were less optimistic compared to the 
questioned British about the discourse by Bush and later by Obama. However, an opinion about 
one part of the discourse about the war in Iraq, is not characteristic for the whole discourse on 
the war in Iraq. Polls show in 2010 47% of the questioned Germans and 52% of the questioned 
British approved the way Obama was dealing with “the situation in Iraq”.233 Although there 
was a great difference regarding the confidence in establishing a stable government, there was 
less a difference in questioned British and Germans who approved the way Obama dealt with 
the situation there.  
 Polls show that another part of the discourse by Obama about the fight against ISIL, was 
attractive and convincing. In 2015, 70% of the questioned Germans and 66% of the questioned 
British were very concerned about ISIL.234 And in 2016, 85% of the questioned Germans and 
79% of the questioned British saw ISIL as a major threat.235 Therefore, polls also show that a 
majority of the German and British respondents supported the US-led military action against 
ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Of the Germans 62% in 2015 and 71% in 2016. And of the British 66% 
in 2015 and 71% in 2016.236 
 Other parts of the discourse on the foreign policy on the war on terrorism were also 
questioned and show that Bush’s discourse was seen as unattractive. Regarding the reflexive 
topic of allies by Bush, in 2002 12% of the questioned Germans and 22% of the questioned 
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British thought the US took into account the view of allies regarding the war on terrorism.237 
Regarding the ‘bad’words used by Bush as shown in chapter four, 55% of the questioned British 
and 74% of the questioned Germans disapproved the naming of ‘axis of evil’.238 
Other parts of Obama’s discourse were more attractive. Regarding closing Guantanamo, 
in 2009 72% of the questioned British and 84% of the questioned Germans approved this 
discourse for closing Guantanamo.239 Regarding Obama’s discourse of carrying out values, in 
2015 only 29% of the questioned British and 21% of the questioned Germans thought the 
interrogation methods of suspected terrorists by the US were justified.240 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter considered the question: what did the allied countries think about the US and its 
foreign policy on the war on terrorism? Polls show that during Obama’s presidency, German 
and British respondents viewed the US more favourably and had more confidence in the US 
president than they did during Bush. Considering influence of the US in their countries in 2008 
and 2009, a majority of the questioned Germans and British witnessed a great deal or fair 
amount of US influence in their country. Although a majority did not consider this a good thing, 
during Obama’s presidency in 2009 more respondents saw this as a good thing than that they 
did in 2008 during Bush. 
 More German and British respondents favoured the US-led efforts to fight terrorism 
during the presidency of Obama compared to the Bush presidency from 2002 until 2012. 
Overall people from the UK had a more positive view than people from Germany. This is also 
shown by more British than German respondents seeing the US-led war on terrorism as a 
sincere effort. Questioned Germans saw the control of oil in the Middle East as an important 
reason for the US-led war on terrorism and the military force against Iraq. This implies that 
questioned Germans did not believe the discourse by Bush at that time, while more questioned 
British did. 
 In 2002 a majority of the questioned British and Germans approved the war in 
Afghanistan and therefore Bush’s discourse was attractive. However, from 2007 to 2011, a 
minority of the German and British respondents thought that US and NATO should keep troops 
in Afghanistan. This means that Bush’s discourse became unattractive. And the discourse by 
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Obama, except for the part of sending more troops into Afghanistan which was disapproved by 
a majority in 2009, about ending the war in Afghanistan was attractive. 
 Considering the operation in Iraq, only a minority of the questioned British wanted the 
UK to join military action in Iraq in 2002 and 2003. This meant that Bush did not convince 
them, in contrast to their government, with his discourse about the need for an operation in Iraq. 
Questioned Germans were also not convinced by the discourse by Bush and were, just as their 
government, against military action in Iraq. A majority of the German respondents was 
therefore convinced in 2003, 2004 and 2005 that not joining military action against Iraq was 
the right decision. Although a majority of the British respondents thought it was the right 
decision to join military action in 2003, in 2004 and 2005 only a minority thought this.  
 The unattractiveness of Bush’s discourse became even more clear when in 2007 a great 
minority of questioned Germans and British wanted the US to keep troops in Iraq, which was 
Bush’s discourse at that time. In 2009 a great majority of the British and German respondents 
approved with Obama’s idea to withdraw troops from Iraq and approved the way Obama was 
dealing with the situation in Iraq, which makes his discourse attractive and convincing. 
 Obama’s discourse about fighting ISIL in Iraq and Syria was also believed by German 
and British respondents. A majority supported the US-led military actions against ISIL in 2015 
and 2016. Another attractive part of the discourse of Obama was the closing of Guantanamo 
and carrying out values, on which a majority of the questioned British and Germans agreed. 
Other parts of Bush’s discourse were, however, less attractive for British and German 
respondents. In 2002, a majority of the questioned Germans and British disapproved with the 
‘axis of evil’ rhetoric and only a minority thought the US considered the views of allies within 
the war on terrorism. 
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7. Conclusion 
Where scholars considered the decline of soft power in general or after specific parts of the 
foreign policy on the war on terrorism, this research considers the shift in soft power throughout 
the war on terrorism and compares two former presidents to each other. Central within this 
research was the question: to what extent has there been a shift in US soft power considering 
the war on terrorism between Bush and Obama from 2001 to 2016? To measure soft power, 
three measurements conceived by Nye Jr. were used: (1) resources in the form of the discourse 
regarding the war on terrorism in speeches from Bush and Obama; (2) behavioural outcomes 
in the form of allied support within three operations carried out under the war on terrorism; (3) 
and polls regarding the US and the war on terrorism.  
To answer the central question, the research was divided into three chapters which all 
considered one measurement. Chapter four therefore considered the discourse by Bush and 
Obama to analyse which president tried to make his discourse about the war on terrorism more 
convincing and attractive. It can be concluded that Bush used more factors and therefore tried 
to make his discourse more convincing and attractive. Bush and Obama differ in their discourse 
on the war on terrorism as is shown in the reflexive topics. Where there may be no real 
differentiation between Bush and Obama regarding strategies, Bush made a lot more use of 
lexicon and syntax trying to make his discourse more attractive and convincing. 
 In the fifth chapter, the influence of US soft power on the decision of Germany and the 
UK to join (or not to join) a military operation as part of the war on terrorism was considered. 
Soft power was of high influence on the decision to join for the UK regarding all three 
operations analysed in this chapter. This did not fluctuate throughout the years nor between 
Bush and Obama. The allied support from Germany, on the other hand, did fluctuate concerning 
the three operations analysed. Germany joined the operation in Afghanistan, however they only 
did ISAF leadership. Therefore, it is questioned whether they joined because they were 
convinced of Bush’s discourse or if they joined because of NATO. Bush was unable to convince 
Germany to join the operation in Iraq, the German government did not believe Bush’s discourse. 
Germany joined the actions against ISIL in Syria and Iraq during the Obama presidency, 
although they did this in a non-military way. Germany only decided to join the operation 
somehow militarily, although not fully, when France asked them to. Therefore, it is concluded 
that soft power of the US somehow played a part to convince Germany of joining the operation 
non-militarily and that it was the soft power of France who made them decide to join the 
operation partly militarily. However, the operation is US-led, and therefore Germany had to be 
feel attractive to Obama’s discourse on ISIL somehow. 
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 The sixth chapter considered what the allied countries thought about the US and its 
foreign policy on the war on terrorism. During Obama’s presidency more questioned British 
and Germans favoured the US, had confidence in the US president and saw the power and 
influence of the US in their country as a good thing. The US-led effort to fight terrorism was 
favoured by more German and British respondents during the Obama presidency compared to 
the Bush presidency. Moreover, Obama’s discourse about the war in Afghanistan and Iraq was 
more attractive and convincing in comparison to Bush’s discourse. Also, polls show that 
Obama’s discourse about the fight against ISIL was convincing and attractive. Besides that, 
where other parts of Bush’s discourse were unattractive and not convincing, the other parts of 
Obama’s discourse were attractive and convincing. 
 The three measurements show that soft power regarding the war on terrorism shifted 
throughout time and that there is a difference between Bush and Obama. Obama had more soft 
power regarding the war on terrorism than Bush did. Where Bush attempted to make his 
discourse more convincing and attractive and tried to create soft power, his discourse was not 
attractive and convincing for the German government to carry out the hoped behavioural 
outcome of allied support. His efforts within the first measurement were also not seen within 
the polls where the US and its president perceived negatively, and his discourse turned out to 
be neither attractive nor convincing. Although Obama made lesser use of the analysed factors 
for his discourse to be convincing and attractive, the other two measurements show his 
discourse about the war on terrorism was eventually more attractive and convincing. Germany 
joined an operation part of the foreign policy on the war on terrorism again and polls show that 
the US, the president, and Obama’s discourse were attractive and convincing for respondents 
in Germany and the UK. Where the soft power in general is seen as declining by scholars this 
thesis shows that soft power regarding the war on terrorism shifted throughout the years. Soft 
power indeed declined during the Bush presidency, but rose again during the Obama presidency 
in comparison to the Bush presidency. 
 Although this research provides some insight into the shift of soft power regarding the 
foreign policy on the war on terrorism throughout the years with a focus on the differences 
between Bush and Obama, a lot remains unstudied. Utilizing the structure of the measurements 
as described by Nye Jr. to measure soft power causes some demarcation for what can and cannot 
be analysed and studied. This could be a focus for further research. Further research could also 
include the Trump presidency when considering the fluctuations of soft power of the US 
regarding the foreign policy on the war on terrorism throughout the years. Besides that, further 
research could focus on measuring soft power regarding other (foreign) policy areas.  
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